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Abstract 
This paper examines the importance of buyer-supplier relationships, geography and the structure of 
the production network in firm performance. We develop a simple model where firms can outsource 
tasks and search for suppliers in different locations. Low search and outsourcing costs lead firms to 
search more and find better suppliers. This in turn drives down the firm’s marginal production costs. 
We test the theory by exploiting the opening of a high-speed (Shinkansen) train line in Japan which 
lowered the cost of passenger travel but left shipping costs unchanged. Using an exhaustive dataset on 
firms’ buyer-seller linkages, we find significant improvements in firm performance as well as creation 
of new buyer-seller links, consistent with the model. 
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1 Introduction
In spite of the widespread perception that firms’ success in part depends on their connections with
suppliers, relatively little work has been done on the structure, performance and importance of
production networks. Even less is known about how geography and trade costs affect links in
production networks. Finally, in spite of a large literature on the role of infrastructure on economic
outcomes, there is almost no evidence on how infrastructure affects supply chains and firm-level
productivity. This paper examines the importance of buyer-supplier relationships and the structure
of the production network in firm performance.
While there has been an explosion of research on social and economic networks and their for-
mation, to date little of that work has considered the supplier-customer relations between firms. In
addition, existing studies are often limited to a particular industry or geography within a country.1
In this paper we use a comprehensive, unique data set on the production network in Japan. Our
data provide supplier-customer links between firms for over 950,000 firms in Japan. This set of
firms accounts for the large majority of private sector economic activity in the country. For the
large majority of firms in Japan, we can determine their location, suppliers, customers and measures
of performance.
We develop a set of stylized facts about the Japanese production network to guide our model.
Large and productive firms have more suppliers than small firms. Geographic proximity plays an
important role in the matching of suppliers and customers. Most connections are local; the median
distance to a supplier is 30 kilometers. Larger firms not only have more suppliers, but, on average,
have suppliers that are farther away. The production network displays negative degree assortivity;
the trading partners of well-connected firms on average are less-well connected themselves. Consider
two firms, one with many suppliers, the other with few. The suppliers to the well-connected firm
have on average relatively few customers. The suppliers to the less-connected firm have on average
many customers. Many of these facts are also present in cross-border trade networks, e.g. negative
degree assortivity is also found in exporter-importer networks in international trade, see Bernard et
al. (2013).
We build a parsimonious model of a domestic economy motivated by the stylized facts. Down-
stream firms require a continuum of tasks as inputs into the production process, e.g. materials
processing, accounting, printing, and distribution services. They can produce the tasks themselves
or outsource them. Finding suppliers is costly, however, and therefore it may not be profitable
for all firms to outsource a given task, even if the market price of a task is lower than the firm’s
marginal cost of supplying the same task. Our model is closely related to the international sourcing
framework in Antràs et al. (2014), but we modify it to allow for the possibility that firms can supply
1See, for example, the seminal work of Uzzi (1996)
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a given task within the boundary of the firm. Downstream firms can observe broad characteristics
of potential upstream locations, i.e. average productivity and trade costs, but need to expend re-
sources to observe the prices of individual tasks in a location. In addition, outsourcing is costly
because of trade costs. Trade costs are here broadly defined; we have in mind both shipping costs
and efficiency losses in the buyer-supplier relationship. In equilibrium, a higher efficiency firm will
search across more locations, source more inputs, and have better performance. If variable trade
costs or the fixed costs of search fall, firms will search more, source more inputs from more distant
locations, and firm sales will rise. These effects will be larger in input-intensive industries where
the marginal benefit of finding better suppliers is greater. For the aggregate economy, locations
with low trade and search costs will have higher performing firms, even if productivity is ex ante
identical across all locations. Our framework therefore offers a supply-side microfoundation for why
measured productivity varies widely across locations, as documented in Sveikauskas (1975), Glaeser
and Maré (2001) and Combes et al. (2012).
To examine the predictions of the model we use the 2004 opening of the southern portion of
the high-speed rail lines in Japan (Kyushu Shinkansen) as a quasi-natural experiment. The route
of this particular extension had been planned at least since 1973 but the actual construction was
subject to substantial timing uncertainty due to numerous budgetary and administrative delays,
thus limiting the scope for anticipation effects. We examine whether firms near new Shinkansen
stations improved their performance after the opening. Estimating a triple difference specification,
we find that performance was better for firms near the new stations after the opening and that firms
in industries with greater purchased input shares performed better compared to firms in industries
with lower purchased input shares.
The model suggests that the firm-level performance improvement is due to the increased number
of suppliers and sourcing locations. We draw on a second cross-section of the Japanese production
network in 2010 to examine whether firms in localities near the new stations increase their number
of suppliers and the number of source locations more than firms in localities that did not become
better connected with the high-speed rail extension. The results show support for the mechanisms
emphasized in the model; the number of connections and the number of source locations both
increase for firms near the new stations.
This paper is naturally related to a growing literature on the determinants of domestic and
foreign sourcing and the impact on firms. Amiti and Konings (2007), Goldberg et al. (2010), Halpern
et al. (2011) and Bøler et al. (2014) examine the role of imported inputs in firm productivity where
foreign and domestic inputs are imperfect substitutes. Our work is closer to Antràs et al. (2014)
who develop and structurally estimate a model where firm performance is positively related to the
intensive and extensive margins of purchased imported inputs. In the domestic production network,
we find systematic relationships between distance to domestic suppliers and firm performance that
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are analogous to those in the international trade context. In this regard our work is related to
Fort (2014) who finds an important role for firm heterogeneity and location in the decision to use
domestic contract manufacturing services.
The paper is also related to a large literature on the effects of infrastructure on economic devel-
opment. Governments typically allocate a large fraction of their budgets to infrastructure projects
and multilateral institutions similarly emphasize infrastructure in the expenditure allocation. Most
research on the effects of infrastructure concentrates on the location of economic activity, income
and aggregate welfare effects. For example, Donaldson (forthcoming) examines the effects of rail-
roads on income and welfare in India, while Duranton et al. (2013) consider the effects of interstate
highways on the level and composition of trade for US cities. Redding and Turner (forthcoming)
survey the literature on the effects of infrastructure on economic activity. This area of research
focuses on the role of infrastructure in reducing transport time and costs for goods between cities
and in reducing the travel time for individuals within a city, i.e. commuting time. Our research
points to another role for infrastructure in reducing travel time for individuals (as opposed to goods)
between regions and the resulting firm-level improvements coming from the supply chain.
Another related strand of recent work studies the geography of knowledge transmission across
locations. Davis and Dingel (2012) model costly idea exchange as the agglomeration force in a
system of cities. Our framework focuses on the cost of connecting to others (firms) and the resulting
improvements in performance. Cristea (2011) considers the importance of face-to-face meetings in
international trade and finds that increased exports raises the demand for business class air travel.
Comin et al. (2012) study technology diffusion over time and find that technology diffuses more
slowly to locations that are farther away from technology leaders. Keller and Yeaple (2013) measure
the cross-country spatial barriers to the transmission of embodied or disembodied knowledge. They
find that person-to-person communication costs increase in distance. Hillberry and Hummels (2008)
examine trade in intermediate goods as an explanation for highly localized shipments in the U.S.
Our work is also related to Giroud (2013) who examines the effect of new airline connections on
within-firm performance of and investment in manufacturing plants. Related work in finance argues
that proximity matters for monitoring and relationships.2 In contrast to his study which examines
reductions in travel costs between headquarters and plants for multi-plant firms, we broaden the
scope by exploring all buyer-supplier connections among all firms in the economy. Moreover, our
model and empirical strategy emphasize the creation and destruction of linkages in response to
infrastructure shocks.
In the literature on firm-to-firm connections, Oberfield (2013) develops a network theory of search
and production where producers potentially sell to many customers but have only one supplier.
Downstream firms consider match-specific productivity and price when choosing among available
2See Lerner (1995), Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Petersen and Rajan (2002).
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techniques. As in our model, the share of purchased inputs matters for the propagation of shocks in
the economy although our focus is on the supplier side rather than the downstream links. Acemoglu
et al. (2012) relate these types of microeconomic shocks to aggregate fluctuations in a model of
sectoral input-output linkages, while Carvalho et al. (2014) use the Japanese production network to
study the supply chain disruptions occurring in the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake in Japan.
While our focus is on buyer-supplier matches in the domestic supply network, it is closely re-
lated to the nascent literature using matched importer-exporter data. Bernard et al. (2013) consider
exporter-importer connections using Norwegian transaction trade data. They find, as we do, neg-
ative assortivity in buyer-seller matches, and in-degree and out-degree distributions that largely
follow power laws. Blum et al. (2012) examine characteristics of trade transactions for the exporter-
importer pairs of Chile-Colombia and Argentina-Chile and also find that small suppliers (exporters)
typically sell to large (importers) and small importers (buyers) source from large suppliers (ex-
porters).
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. We describe the data in Section 2 and develop a
set of stylized facts about buyer-supplier relationships in Section 3. In Section 4, we develop our
multi-location model of domestic sourcing. We describe and estimate our natural experiment along
with various robustness checks in Section 5 and provide concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Data
The data employed in this paper comes from two main sources. First, production network data
for two moments in time, 2005 and 2010, are assembled by Tokyo Shoko Research, LTD. (TSR).
TSR is a credit reporting agency and firms provide information to TSR in the course of obtaining
credit reports on potential suppliers and customers or when attempting to qualify as a supplier. The
resulting database contains information on more than 950,000 firms in each cross-section, represents
more than half of all the firms in Japan and covers all sectors of the economy. The TSR sample is
close to the full population of firms with more than 4 employees.3
Each firm provides rank-ordered lists of the most important suppliers (up to 24) and customers
(24). TSR also collects information on employment, the number of establishments, the number of
factories, up to three (4-digit) industries, sales, profits and a physical address. In addition, the
database records TSR’s credit score for the firm. Using an address matching service provided by
the Center for Spatial Information Science at the University of Tokyo, we are able to match a firm’s
address to longitude and latitude data.4 We use the geo-coded data to create a measure of great
circle distance between firms. The top 3 prefectures by counts of firms are Tokyo, Osaka and Aichi
3Firms with 1 to 4 employees are underrepresented in TSR compared to Census data, while for firms with 5 or
more employees, the firm size distribution in TSR is very similar to the distribution in Census data.
4As each firm only reports one address, the geographic information for multi-establishment firms is likely to reflect
the location of the headquarters.
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(Nagoya) while the top three 2-digit industries by counts are General Construction Work, Specialist
Construction Work and Equipment Installation.
Second, firm-level balance sheet data comes from Kigyou Katsudou Kihon Chousa Houkokusho
(The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities), henceforth Kikatsu,
for the period 1998 to 2008. Kikatsu is an annual survey that gives detailed information about firm
activities such as sales, employment, capital stock, intermediate purchases and industry affiliation.
It covers the full population of manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms with more than 50
employees and with capital of more than 30 million yen.
2.1 Supplier and Customer Connections
The TSR data has both advantages and disadvantages relative to other production network data
sets. Among the advantages is the inclusion of firms of all sizes and industries including both
publicly listed and unlisted firms. In addition, the TSR firms self-report their most important
suppliers and customers; there is no cutoff in terms of sales or purchases.5 However, the 24-firm
limit for suppliers and customers potentially causes a truncation in the number of relationships in
the self-reported data relative to the actual number of such connections.
To mitigate this issue, we combine both self-reported and other-reported information for each
firm in the data and use the union of own-reported and other-reported information. For firms A
and B, we consider A to be a supplier of B if both firms are in the TSR data and either (i) A reports
B as customer or (ii) B reports A as supplier. Note that some firms that are reported as suppliers
and customers are outside the TSR set of firms (NTSR), i.e. they are domestic Japanese firms but
are not customers or clients of TSR.
In Figure 1 we show possible suppliers and customers for a firm (Firm A) in the TSR database.
Firm A reports that it has two customers, TSR4 and NTSR2, and two suppliers, TSR1 and NTSR1.
Other firms also report connections to Firm A: TSR2 reports Firm A as a customer while TSR3
reports Firm A as a supplier. In determining Firm A’s in-degree, the number of suppliers, and its
out-degree, the number of customers, we ignore the NTSR links and include both own-reported
and other-reported connections. Thus, Firm A has an in-degree of 2 (TSR1 and TSR2) and an
out-degree of 2 (TSR3 and TSR4).
The 24-firm limit will be binding for very large firms and therefore most of their customers and
suppliers are other-reported. One may suspect that this implies that large-to-large linkages are
underreported, because both firms may not report the other. Recall, however, that firms provide
a rank-ordered list of their connections; connections to large firms are therefore likely to end up
high on the list. Moreover, the degree distributions reported in the next Section (Figure 2) do not
5In their analysis of US production networks, Atalay et al. (2011) use Compustat data on publicly listed firms
and their major customers defined as firms that purchase more than 10 percent of the seller’s revenue.
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Figure 1: Supplier and Customer Connections: An Example
indicate any discontinuity around the 24-firm threshold.
A number of firms report either no suppliers and/or no customers among the TSR firms. This
does not mean they recorded no suppliers or customers on their forms but instead all their reported
connections are outside the TSR set of firms. A report of no TSR suppliers or no TSR customers
might occur for several reasons. A firm might appear to have no TSR customers because all the
domestic firms that are customers are outside the TSR database, all its customers are foreign firms
or all its customers are non-firms, e.g. the public or government. A firm might appear to have no
TSR suppliers because all the domestic firms that are suppliers are outside the TSR database or
all its suppliers are foreign.6 We choose to work only with the set of TSR firms with a positive
in-degree or positive out-degree (links to other TSR firms) and find no evidence of systematic bias
in the the sample of firms with positive TSR degree. Using NTSR+TSR data, the distribution of
firms with TSR degree equal zero is virtually identical to the overall sample of firms, i.e. the mean
and variance of NTSR+TSR out-degree and in-degree distributions are the same.
3 The Production Network
In this section we begin to explore the domestic production network in Japan.7 There are 961,318
firms (nodes) in the TSR production network with 3,783,711 supplier-customer connections (directed
edges). Of those nodes, 771,107 (676,320) nodes have positive in-degree (out-degree) among TSR
firms. For firms with positive in-degree, the mean number of suppliers is 4.9 and the median is 2.
6It seems implausible to imagine that an operating firm has no actual domestic suppliers. This is supported by
the fact that more TSR firms report no customers than report no suppliers.
7All descriptive statistics refer to the 2005 cross-section. Some of these network characteristics are also presented
in Saito et al. (2007) and Ohnishi et al. (2010).
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Figure 2: In-degree and Out-degree CDFs
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For firms with positive out-degree, the mean number of customers is 5.6 and the median is one.
The cdfs of the in-degree and out-degree distributions are given in Figure 2. The distributions are
well-approximated by a Pareto (power law) distribution. The estimated Pareto shape parameter
is -1.32 for the in-degree distribution and -1.50 for the out-degree distribution. Deviations from
the Pareto are found in the extreme tails of the distribution. Firms with a very large number
of connections are somewhat under-represented while firms with few connections appear in greater
numbers. These deviations from a power law distribution are comparable to those found in exporter-
importer degree distributions by Bernard et al. (2013) but are much smaller in magnitude compared
to those found by Atalay et al. (2011) for supplier-customer connections derived from data on large
US firms and their large customers.
3.1 Stylized Facts
In this section, we document four facts from the data that will guide the development of the model
in Section 4. We explore the relationship between firm characteristics, connections in the production
network and geography.
Fact 1: Larger firms have more suppliers. Higher sales are associated with a larger number
of supplier connections. Figure 3 plots the kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of a firm’s
in-degree (vertical axis) on sales (horizontal axis), both in logs. The linear regression slope is 0.36,
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Figure 3: Size, in-degree and out-degree.
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Note: 2005 data. The figure shows the kernel-weighted local polynomial regres-
sion of firm-level log degree (vertical axis) on log sales (horizontal axis). The
two lines represent in-degree and out-degree as separate regressions. Gray area
denotes the 95 percent confidence bands. Sample is first trimmed by excluding
the 0.1 percent lowest and highest observations of sales.
meaning that a 10 percent increase in sales is associated with a 3.6 percent increase in the number
of suppliers. A similar positive relationship exists between a firm’s sales and out-degree, mirroring
the findings in Bernard et al. (2013).
Fact 2. Larger firms have suppliers in more locations and their distance to suppliers is higher.
Figure 4 shows that larger firms tend to have suppliers in more municipalities. A firm in the 1st
decile of the sales distribution has suppliers in 1.5 locations while a firm in the 9th decile has
suppliers in roughly 4 locations.8 At the same time, larger firms have more remote connections;
Figure 5 plots the fitted values from a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of a firm’s median
distance to its suppliers on its sales (both in logs). The median distance to suppliers is around 20
km for firms in the 1st decile of the sales distribution, while median distance is roughly 50 percent
higher (32 km) for firms in the 9th decile of the sales distribution. A similar positive relationship
also exists between a firm’s sales and median distance to its customers, as well as between distance
and the number of municipalities a firm is supplying.
We also compare buyers that have matched to the same supplier. The same pattern arises
here; the distance to the supplier is increasing in the performance of the customer. Table 1 reports
8There are in total 1410 municipalities in our dataset, see also Section 5.1.
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Figure 4: Size and number of supplier & customer locations.
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Note: 2005 data. The figure shows the kernel-weighted local polynomial regres-
sion of firm-level log number of municipalities with connections (vertical axis) on
log sales (horizontal axis). The two lines represent the supplier and customer side
as separate regressions. Gray area denotes the 95 percent confidence bands. Sam-
ple is first trimmed by excluding the 0.1 percent lowest and highest observations
of sales.
results from a regression of firm performance (in-degree, sales, employment and labor productivity)
on distance to the supplier, controlling for supplier fixed effects and seller prefecture fixed effects.
The relationship is strongly positive; increasing distance by ten percent to the supplier is associated
with 1.9 percent higher sales in the buyer firm.
Robustness: A potential concern is that Facts 1 and 2 are partly driven by differences across
industries. For example, large firms may belong to certain types of industries that for various
reasons require many suppliers. Hence, we also explore within-industry correlations between size
and our various outcome variables. Table 2 shows results when regressing firm characteristics on
log size and 3-digit JSIC industry fixed effects. The outcome variables are the same as above: in-
degree, median distance to suppliers and number of sourcing municipalities. For completeness, we
also report results on the customer side: out-degree, median distance to customers and number of
municipalities with customers.
An additional concern is that larger firms have more plants, so that distance from the relevant
plant to a supplier may not be higher for larger firms. We investigate this by including an interaction
term between log size and a dummy variable for whether the firm is single-plant or not. The
interaction is close to zero, indicating that there is a positive relationship also for single-plant
9
Figure 5: Size and median distance to connections.
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Note: 2005 data. The figure shows the kernel-weighted local polynomial regres-
sion of firm-level median log distance to the firm’s connections (vertical axis)
on log sales (horizontal axis). The two lines represent distance to suppliers and
customers as separate regressions. Gray area denotes the 95 percent confidence
bands. Sample is first trimmed by excluding the 0.1 percent lowest and highest
observations of sales.
firms. We also plot the size-median distance relationship for single-plant firms only; Figure 11 in
the Appendix shows the same polynomial regression plot for this group. Also, the within-supplier
relationship between distance and performance continues to be positive when considering single-
plant firms only (Table 1, rows 5 and 6).
In the model (Section 4), small and large firms require the same number of tasks, but large firms
optimally decide to outsource more of them. An alternative hypothesis is that large firms offer more
products and therefore also require more tasks than smaller firms. We do not observe the tasks
performed within the firm, so we cannot directly test this hypothesis. What we can do, however,
is to check whether Facts 1 and 2 also hold for firms that belong to a single 3-digit JSIC industry
(in the data, each firm can belong to up to 3 industries). If the positive relationship between
size and in-degree also holds for single-industry firms (within an industry), then this suggests that
differences in the range of tasks produced is not driving the empirical relationships. Table 2 includes
the interaction between log size and a dummy variable for whether the firm is single-industry or
not. The interaction is typically negative but small; hence our results survive when considering this
group of firms.
Fact 3: The majority of connections is formed locally. Distance is important in the formation
10
Figure 6: Density of distance across buyer-seller pairs.
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Note: 2005 data. The figure shows the density of distance in km for all buyer-
seller pairs. The gray bars represent the density from actual linkages whereas the
white bars represent the density from random linkages.
of links. We start by calculating the distance between any supplier-customer pair ij and show the
density of distance in Figure 6. As above, geolocation is based on a firm’s headquarters, so for
multi-plant firms the interpretation is distance between headquarters. The gray bars represent the
density based on actual linkages. The white bars represent the density based on random linkages.9
The median (mean) distance is 30 (172) km. Hence, the majority of connections is formed locally.
Even so, a few connections span very long distances, so that the average distance is much greater
than the median. Moreover, the actual distances between firms are much smaller than what would
emerge in a random network. In the network with randomly drawn connections, median (mean)
distance is 464 (540) km.
Fact 4: There is negative degree assortativity among sellers and buyers. One distinguishing
feature of networks is the extent to which a well-connected node is linked to other well-connected
nodes, known as degree assortivity. While there is an extensive body of research on degree assortivity
in technical and social networks, these relationships are less well documented in economics networks.
We find that the better connected a firm, the less well-connected is its average connection. Figure
7 provides an overview of degree assortivity in the Japanese production network. The figure shows
9A random production network is generated by drawing ni random customer links for firm i, where ni is based
on the actual out-degree of firm i. Then, distance between all random links are calculated based on the geocode of
the firms.
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all possible values of the number of suppliers per Japanese firm, a, on the x-axis, and the average
number of (customer) connections of these suppliers, b (a), on the y-axis. The interpretation of a
point with the coordinates (10,1) is as follows: For a Japanese firm sourcing from 10 suppliers, the
average supplier has one customer. The fitted regression line has a slope of -0.19, so a 10 percent
increase in number of suppliers is associated with a 2 percent decline in the average supplier’s
number of customers.10
Figure 7: Degree Assortivity - Suppliers and Customers of Suppliers
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Note: 2005 data. The figure shows all possible values of the number of suppliers
per firm, a, on the x-axis, and the average number of customer connections of
these suppliers, b (a), on the y-axis. Axes scales are in logs. The fitted regression
line and 95% confidence intervals are denoted by the solid line and gray area.
The slope coefficient is -0.19.
This results suggests that the best firms, those with many connections, are selling to firms who on
average have fewer connections themselves. Interestingly, social networks typically feature positive
assortative matching, that is, highly connected nodes tend to attach to other highly connected
nodes, while negative correlations are usually found in technical networks such as servers on the
Internet (Jackson and Rogers, 2007).11 In a recent paper, Bernard et al. (2013) also find negative
assortivity between trading firms using Norwegian exporter data matched to foreign importers and
10The correlation between degree and mean degree of connections is a standard measure of assortativity in networks
(Jackson and Rogers, 2007).
11In the friendship network among prison inmates considered by Jackson and Rogers (2007), the correlation between
a node’s in-degree and the average in-degree of its neighbors is 0.58. The correlation in our data is -0.31. Serrano and
Boguna (2003) find evidence of negative sorting in the network of trading countries; i.e. highly connected countries,
in terms of trading partners, tend to attach to less connected countries.
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Colombian importer trade data matched to foreign exporters.
The finding of negative degree assortivity may be influenced by the location of the firm. To
check this we control for the location of both the firm and its connections. Specifically, we ask
whether firms in a prefecture i (e.g., Tokyo) with many suppliers in prefecture j (e.g., Osaka) are
trading with less well-connected firms in Osaka, in terms of their number of customers in Tokyo.
We include fixed effects for both the location of firm as well as its suppliers,
Supplier Outdegreeij = α
1
i + α
2
j + βIndegreeij + ij β = −0.120 s.e. (0.003)
Again we find negative assortivity: firms with more suppliers in a destination market are sourcing
from firms with fewer customers. Controlling for destination countries, Bernard et al. (2013) esti-
mate a comparable coefficient of -0.13 when considering buyer-seller matches in Norwegian exporter
data and -0.20 in matches from Colombian importer data. Our findings of negativity assortivity is
not limited to this specific configuration of in- and out-degree. We find similar relationships when
using customer out-degree or an undirected measure of the total number of connections.12
4 The Model
We develop a parsimonious model of outsourcing in a domestic economy motivated by the facts in
the previous section. The basic structure is as follows. Firms require a continuum of tasks as inputs
into the production process, e.g. materials processing, accounting, printing and mailing services.
They can produce the tasks themselves or outsource them. Finding suppliers is costly, however, and
therefore it may not be profitable for all firms to outsource a given task, even though the market
price of a task is lower than the firm’s marginal cost of supplying the same task. This setup will
produce theoretical predictions that are consistent with the empirical regularities documented in
Section 3 and will guide the development of the empirical methodology in Section 5. Our model
is closely related to the framework in Antràs et al. (2014), but we modify it in several directions.
First, we allow for the possibility of in-house production, i.e. that firms can supply a given task
within the boundary of the firm. This margin of adjustment is crucial in order to match the empirical
regularities. Second, geography in the model will be continuous. We combine this with distributional
assumptions which allow us to obtain sharp analytical results. Third, our model is a framework for
understanding domestic, and not international, sourcing. Since productivity differences are typically
much smaller within a country than across countries, and since labor is typically much more mobile
within a country than across countries, we assume that wages and productivity are common across
locations.
12In our data, the correlation is negative and significant for (in-degree,average in-degree of suppliers), (in-
degree,average in-degree of customers), (in-degree,average out-degree of customers), (out-degree,average out-
degree of suppliers), (out-degree,average in-degree of suppliers), (out-degree,average in-degree of customers), (out-
degree,average out-degree of customers).
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4.1 Setup
Geography, sectors and market structure. The economy consists of a unit continuum of locations
i ∈ S. Each location consists of an upstream and a downstream sector. Downstream firms combine
labor and a unit continuum of tasks and sell their output to final consumers. Upstream firms produce
a single task using labor only. Within a location i and for a given task ω, there are many identical
firms producing ω at the same marginal cost. Hence, the upstream sector is characterized by perfect
competition. Downstream firms are monopolistically competitive and produce a differentiated good
with efficiency z which varies across firms.
Production technology. The production function of a downstream firm is
y = zlαv1−α,
where l is labor, α is the labor share and v is a CES composite of the unit continuum of tasks. The
CES price index is
P 1−ρ =
ˆ 1
0
pu (ω)
1−ρ dω,
where pu (ω) is the price of an individual task ω and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between tasks.
The firm can potentially produce all tasks in-house. If so, the firm’s efficiency in producing a task
ω is a realization of a random variable φ from the Frechet distribution F (φ) = e−T0φ−θ , where T0
determines the average efficiency in producing a task and θ > ρ−1 is inversely related to dispersion
in task productivity. F (φ) is identical across all downstream firms, hence, total factor productivity
z is the only source of firm-level heterogeneity. As we will see, in equilibrium, the price pu (ω)
will depend on whether the firm outsources a task or not and, if outsourced, which location it will
outsource from.
The production function of an upstream firm in location i is yu (ω, i) = φ (ω, i) l. The efficiency
of producing a task ω is a realization of a random variable φ from the Frechet distribution Fu (φ) =
e−Tφ−θ . The parameter T governs the average productivity. To keep the model tractable we
assume that average productivity T is identical across locations i. Upstream firms in i selling to j
are subject to iceberg trade costs τ (i, j) ≥ 1. Trade costs are here broadly defined; we have in mind
both shipping costs and efficiency losses in the buyer-supplier relationship. The cost of supplying ω
from i to j is therefore w (i) τ (i, j) /φ (ω, i), where w (i) is the nominal wage in i. For tractability,
we assume that final goods are costlessly traded. This makes the price index of final goods identical
in every location.13
Labor. Each location is inhabited by L (i) workers, and the aggregate (exogenous) supply of
workers is L¯ =
´
S L (i) di. Consumers derive utility from consumption of the downstream goods.
13Without this assumption, nominal wages w (i) would vary across locations because the final goods price index
would vary across locations (given that labor mobility equalizes real wages across locations). Costlessly traded final
goods allows us to abstract from this.
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They have identical CES preferences with an elasticity of substitution σ. There is perfect labor
mobility across regions. Since finals goods are costlessly supplied to consumers across locations,
nominal wage equalization is sufficient to leave workers indifferent between locations. Henceforth,
we denote the common nominal wage by w.
Entry. There is a fixed measure of downstream firms in each location, m (i). As there is no free
entry, the production of final goods leaves rents. We assume that consumers derive income not only
from labor but also from the dividends of a mutual fund. Each consumer owns w shares of the fund
and profits are redistributed to them in units of labor. Total worker income in location i is then
w (1 + ψ)L (i), where ψ is the dividend per share of the mutual fund.
Outsourcing. The downstream firm located in j can choose to produce a task ω itself or outsource
it. The firm can observe average productivity T and trade costs τ (i, j) from source i. Observing
individual prices for all ω, however, requires effort. Specifically, the firm must incur a fixed cost
f (j) paid in terms of labor to observe individual prices in a location i.14 As we will see, more
productive firms find it optimal to search a wider range of locations because the marginal profits
from search are higher for high z firms, while the marginal cost f (j) is constant. Given that f (j)
does not vary by source, each location i can be ranked according to its attractiveness as a supplier
location, where attractiveness is defined by τ (i, j)−θ (see Antràs (2014)). A firm in j will therefore
search all locations i where τ (i, j) is lower than some threshold value (to be defined below). As in
Eaton and Kortum (2002), conditional on a set of search locations, firm z’s share of purchases from
location i is
χ (z, i, j) =
Tτ (i, j)−θ
Φ (z, j)
.
Φ (z, j) is a measure of market access,
Φ (z, j) = T0 +
ˆ τ¯(z,j)
1
Tτ−θg (τ, j) dτ, (1)
where τ¯ (z, j) is the highest cost location that z located in j is willing to search. g is the density of
trade costs to location j.
The share of tasks outsourced is
o (z, j) = 1− T0
Φ (z, j)
.
Adding more locations to search will raise τ¯ and Φ. More search therefore gives more outsourcing
o. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the task price index is P (z, j) = λwΦ (z, j)−1/θ where λ is a
constant.15 Hence, more outsourcing leads to lower input costs P with an elasticity 1/θ. Searching
an additional location means that the firm can observe a new set of prices for all tasks ω. The
14In order to keep the problem tractable, we do not allow an (i, j) specific f .
15λ1−ρ = Γ
(
θ−(ρ−1)
θ
)
where Γ is the Gamma function.
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probability of finding at least one task with a lower price than the existing one is strictly positive,
and therefore the price index P (z, j) must go down.
4.2 Optimal Search
The maximization problem of the firm is
max
τ¯
{pi (z, j)− wf (j)n (z, j)} ,
where pi (z, j) is gross profits of firm z located in j and n (z, j) is the measure of locations to search.
Total sales of the downstream firm can be written r = Ap1−σ where A is a demand shifter and p is
the firm’s price. Profits are proportional to sales, pi = r/σ. Appendix A derives the solution to the
problem of the firm as well as the second order condition. The solution to τ¯ is
τ¯ (z, j) = κ1
(
T
wσ
A
f (j)
)1/θ
Φ (z, j)−k/θ z(σ−1)/θ (2)
where k = 1− (σ − 1) (1− α) /θ and κ1 is a constant.16 For an arbitrary geography g (τ, j), one can
jointly solve equations (1) and (2), which is a system of two equations and two unknowns τ¯ (z, j)
and Φ (z, j).
The expression for the hurdle τ¯ has a number of interesting features. First, better market access
Φ leads to more search when k < 0 and less search when k > 0. The model of Antràs (2014) has the
same property and describes these as the complements and substitutes cases respectively. Keeping
Φ constant, lower search costs f (j) lead to more search (higher τ¯). Higher efficiency z and more
demand A also lead to more search (higher τ¯).
4.3 Model and Data
We now return to the stylized facts presented in Section 3 and relate them to the model. The proofs
are found in Appendix B.
First, more productive firms outsource more tasks and therefore have more suppliers:
∂o (z, j)
∂z
> 0,
because ∂Φ (z, j) /∂z > 0. Given that more productive firms search more, they are more likely to
find a sourcing option for a given task ω at a lower cost than the cost of producing in-house. This is
consistent with the evidence in Figure 3, that larger firms tend to have more suppliers. Note that,
according to the model, higher efficiency z leads to both increased sales and in-degree, while higher
in-degree itself leads to greater sales. Hence, the level of sales for a given firm is determined by both
16κ1 =
(
(m¯λ1−α)1−σ
σ
(σ−1)(1−α)
θ
)1/θ
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the direct effect of core efficiency z and the indirect effect of in-degree. The positive correlation
shown Figure 3 is a result of both the direct and indirect effects.
Second, more productive firms search more and costlier locations:
∂τ¯
∂z
> 0.
High z firms have a greater incentive to search more locations because the potential cost savings are
larger for more productive firms. As a consequence, more productive firms have higher maximum
and average trade costs to suppliers. This is consistent with the evidence in Figures 4 and 5, that
larger firms tend to have suppliers in more locations and higher distance to their suppliers. A
corollary is that, when comparing a supplier’s customers in different markets, the average customer
in a more remote market is more productive than the average customer in a nearby market. This
is shown formally in Appendix B.4 and is consistent with the empirical evidence in Table 1, that
remote customers of a given supplier tends to be larger and have many connections.
Third, more productive firms reach suppliers in markets that are on average less well connected.
Specifically, consider a firm with efficiency z in location j, sourcing from the marginal location
τ¯ (z, j). Denote the expected measure of customers from j among upstream firms in z’s marginal
location c¯ (z, j). Then
∂c¯ (z, j)
∂z
< 0.
This reflects the fact that higher z firms reach costlier locations and the suppliers there are on
average not very competitive in z’s home market. This is consistent with the evidence in Figure 7
on negative degree assortativity.17
4.4 The Density of Trade Costs
So far, we have not imposed any structure on the density of trade costs g (τ, j). In this section,
we will choose a functional form for g() that will allow us to derive closed form expressions for key
relationships in the model (e.g. equations (1) and 2)). This in turn helps us to derive theoretical
predictions that will later be tested in the data (Proposition 1 in the next section).
We assume that g (τ, j) is inverse Pareto with shape γ > θ and support [1, τH ], g (τ) =
γ
τ−γH
1−τ−γH
τγ−1. An inverse Pareto captures the notion that a location has few nearby markets and
many remote markets. The upper bound τH is the maximum trade cost within Japan. One can
show that a higher τH shifts the trade cost distribution to the right. In other words a distribution
with a high τH first-order stochastically dominates a distribution with a low τH (Appendix F).
17Note that the dependent variable in Figure 7 is average out-degree whereas c¯ (z, j) is marginal out-degree, i.e.
expected out-degree in z’s least profitable location. In practice, this makes little difference because in the model the
average is pinned down by the marginal out-degree.
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Therefore, τH is a convenient metric for average trade costs in the economy.Appendix F provides
empirical evidence that the inverse Pareto is a good approximation of the empirical distance density
in our dataset.
4.5 Testable Predictions
As we discuss later in Section 5, we will exploit a natural experiment where a large shock to in-
frastructure lowered passenger travel time (but not goods travel time) between many location-pairs
in Japan. This empirical exercise allows us to to quantify the impact of a large-scale infrastruc-
ture project on firm performance and to evaluate the importance of the theoretical mechanism
emphasized in this paper. In order to guide the subsequent empirical work, this section details the
consequences of such a shock according to the model.
First, consider the impact on firm sales of lower search costs f (j). Lower f (j) leads to sales
growth of a downstream firm in j. Holding final goods demand A constant,
∂ ln r (z, j)
∂ ln f (j)
=
(σ − 1) (1− α)
θ
∂ ln Φ (z, j)
∂ ln f (j)
< 0.
The elasticity ∂ ln Φ (z, j) /∂ ln f (j) < 0 measures the fall in market access from an increase in f (j)
(Appendix B.2). Now consider how ∂ ln r (z, j) /∂ ln f (j) varies across industries with different labor
intensities α:
∂2 ln r (z, j)
∂ ln f (j) ∂α
=
σ − 1
θ
(
−∂ ln Φ (z, j)
∂ ln f (j)
+ (1− α) ∂
2 ln Φ (z, j)
∂ ln f (j) ∂α
)
.
The cross elasticity is the sum of direct and indirect effects. The direct effect is that a percent
reduction in input costs P (z) will have a stronger positive effect on sales in industries where in-
puts constitute a large share of total costs. The indirect effect is that input-intensive firms may
search more or less intensively relative to labor-intensive firms when f (j) falls (the cross elasticity
∂2 ln Φ (z, j) /∂ ln f (j) ∂α). Appendix D shows that both the direct and indirect effect have the
same sign when g (τ, j) is inverse Pareto. Hence, the total effect is
∂2 ln r (z, j)
∂ ln f (j) ∂α
> 0,
so that sales growth is stronger for input-intensive firms relative to labor-intensive firms when search
costs fall.
Second, consider the impact on firm sales of lower variable trade costs. Using the same inverse
Pareto parameterization of the trade cost distribution g (τ, j), Appendix D shows that ∂ ln r (z, j) /∂ ln τH <
0 and ∂2 ln r (z, j) /∂ ln τH∂α > 0. Hence, lower variable trade costs, e.g. more efficient buyer-
supplier relationships or lower shipping costs, increase sales, and sales growth is stronger for input-
intensive firms. We summarize this in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. (i) Lower search costs f (j) and average trade costs lead to growth in sales among
downstream firms in j. (ii) Sales growth is stronger in input-intensive (low α) relative to labor
intensive (high α) industries.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 forms the basis of our identification strategy in Section 5.1.
Third, consider the impact on supplier connections among firms in j of lower search costs f (j).
Lower f (j) leads to more outsourcing and suppliers from more locations among downstream firms
in j, see Appendix B.2,
∂o (z, j)
∂f (j)
< 0 and
∂n (z, j)
∂f (j)
< 0.
Lower f (j) means that the cost of obtaining information about prices is lower. Firms therefore
search additional locations (τ¯ and n increases). There is a positive probability of finding a task at
a lower price compared to the price of in-house production. Hence, outsourcing must also increase.
Fourth, consider the impact on supplier connections among firms in j of lower average variable
trade costs. Again, using the Pareto parameterization, one can show that
∂o (z, j)
∂τH
< 0 and
∂n (z, j)
∂τH
< 0.
Intuitively, lower average trade costs, e.g. due to more efficient buyer-seller relationships, induce
firms to search more markets and outsource a larger share of the tasks. We summarize this in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. Lower search costs and lower average variable trade costs lead to more outsourcing
and suppliers from more locations among downstream firms in j.
Proof. See Appendix D.
4.6 Closing the Model
Given the assumptions above, both product markets and the labor market clear. Labor market
clearing can be seen as follows. Expenditure by final consumers, E, equals total wage income plus
profits from the monopolistic sector. Moreover, consumer income must equal the value of output in
upstream and downstream production, SalesUp and SalesDown, respectively. Hence, we have
E = w (1 + ψ) L¯
= SalesUp + SalesDown. (3)
The aggregate value of labor demand equals aggregate sales in upstream and downstream production
minus aggregate profits. Inserting equation (3) gives us
wLD = SalesUp + SalesDown − wψL¯ = wL¯.
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Therefore, aggregate labor demand LD equals supply L¯.
5 Production Networks and Productivity: A Natural Experiment
This section details our identification strategy for estimating the impact of lower trade and search
costs on firm performance and linkages in the production network. We start by providing some
background on the natural experiment.
The southern portion of the high-speed (bullet) train network in Japan was expanded in March
2004 (Kyushu Shinkansen). This resulted in a dramatic reduction in travel time between major
cities in the area. For example, travel time between Kagoshima and Shin-Yatsushiro declined from
130 minutes to 35 minutes, and travel time between Hakata and Kagoshima declined from 4 hours
to just 2 hours. Figure 8 gives an overview of the geography. The black dots are locations within
30 km of a new Shinkansen station, whereas the gray dots are all other localities in the dataset.
Although the geographical scope is somewhat limited, the new rail line extended Shinkansen service
to two prefectures with a total population of 3.5 million, roughly that of Connecticut.
The Shinkansen expansion offers several advantages for assessing the impact on infrastructure
on linkages and firm performance. First, the plan of the expansion started already in 1973, making
it relatively unlikely that firms in our sample could influence the timing and location of stations.
Moreover, the timing of completion was subject to substantial uncertainty starting in 1991, limiting
the scope for anticipation effects. Nevertheless, our empirical methodology addresses endogeneity
concerns in a variety of ways as discussed below. Second, goods in Japan do not travel on the
Shinkansen and there was no contemporaneous reduction in travel time for goods along this southern
route, as discussed in Section 5.1.4.
5.1 Economic Integration and Firm Performance
In this section we ask whether and to what extent the Shinkansen expansion improved performance
among firms in affected regions. As shown in Proposition 1, the model suggests a simple iden-
tification strategy. Lower variable trade costs, due to more efficient buyer-supplier relationships,
and lower search costs, f (j), improve firm sales because they reduces marginal costs directly and
indirectly, by enabling firms to find lower cost or higher quality suppliers. Moreover, the impact
is greater for input-intensive firms (low α firms) relative to labor-intensive firms.18 Intuitively, im-
proved travel time has no impact on marginal costs in an industry that does not rely on inputs,
i.e. when α = 1. Of course, sales may improve in α = 1 industries as well, because improved travel
18A disconnect between the theory and the data is that, in the data, virtually all firms are both suppliers and
customers. As such, there is no clear empirical distinction between upstream and downstream firms. One could
extend the model to incorporate a round-about production structure, so that suppliers are themselves sourcing from
other firms, with an industry-specific labor share α.
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Figure 8: Kyushu Shinkansen treated cells.
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time allows firms to find new customers. Our empirical strategy will difference out this mechanism,
i.e. the methodology only identifies marginal cost effects and not demand side effects.
Consider the following regression,
ln yfjrt = α
1
f + α
2
rt + βStationf ×Hj × I [t ≥ 2004] + βXfjrt + fjrt, (4)
where yfjrt is a measure of firm performance for firm f in industry j located in region r at time t,
relative to average performance in the same industry-year.19 We focus on the 8 year period 2000 to
2008, i.e. 4 years before and after the infrastructure shock.
In addition to using sales as the outcome variable, we also use sales per employee (LP ) and
revenue TFP (TFPR). In monopolistic competition models, LP and TFPR are constant across
firms within an industry. However, if output prices among treated firms do not adjust immediately
in response to the infrastructure shock, then LP and TFPR are expected to increase, see Appendix
E. For TFPR, this occurs because TFPR controls for the firm’s value of inputs (in the absence of
firm-level input deflators), so that if firm-level input prices decline, then TFPR will rise.20
The main independent variable is the interaction between Stationf , which is one if firm f is
within 30 km of a new station, Hj which is the input intensity of the industry in 2003 and I [t ≥ 2004]
19Appendix G.1 details the construction of the dependent variable.
20Firm performance is measured relative to industry (3 digit)-year means. There are in total 315 3 digit industries
in the data. TFPR is estimated using the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology, see Appendix G.1.
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which is an indicator variable taking the value 1 from 2004 and onwards. The 30 km threshold for
station is chosen so that total travel time is significantly affected and that Shinkansen dominates
alternative modes of transport. For example, for a firm 60 km from a station, car travel time to the
station would amount to 40 to 60 minutes, and hence the percentage drop in total travel time would
be significantly less compared to a firm located near the station. We also check the results with
other thresholds in Section 5.1.2. Input intensity is defined as 1 minus the labor share of the 3-digit
industry in 2003. The labor share is the industry’s wage costs relative to total costs, see Appendix
G. α1f and α
2
rt are firm and prefecture-year fixed effects. There are 47 prefectures in Japan.
The covariates inXfjrt are the remaining interactions Stationf×I [t ≥ 2004] andHj×I [t ≥ 2004].
In addition, since prefectures are relatively large geographic areas, we introduce a second geographic
control. Each prefecture is further divided into local administrative units called municipalities.
We have in total 1410 municipalities in the dataset, making the average population of a munic-
ipality roughly 90,000 (Japan’s total population was 127.8 million in 2005) The high number of
municipality-year pairs means that municipality-year fixed effects are computationally infeasible.
We can, however, include a variable for average performance in a municipality-year.21 For example,
if ln yfjrt is sales, we include average log sales excluding firm f in the municipality-year as a control
variable.
The regression in equation (4) is a triple differences model and the intuition for identification is
as follows. The Shinkansen expansion is expected to bring higher performance gains for an input-
intensive firm located close to a new station compared to a labor-intensive firm located close to
a new station. The empirical strategy is to compare the growth of input-intensive firms before
and after 2004 (1st difference) to the growth of labor-intensive firms (2nd difference), and compare
this differential effect in locations with a new station relative locations without a new station (3rd
difference).
The triple differences approach resolves a number of potential concerns. First, performance
growth due to demand-side effects (i.e. growth among labor-intensive firms due to new customers)
is differenced out because demand side effects are expected to affect labor-intensive and input-
intensive firms similarly.22 Second, a potential concern is that input-intensive firms may grow faster
than labor-intensive firms even in the absence of the Shinkansen expansion. The methodology
controls for this because the triple interaction coefficient β will only capture the differential impact
(input intensive relative to labor intensive) for firms close to a station relative to the differential
impact for firms that are far from a station. Hence, if input-intensive firms grow faster in every
location, then β will be zero. Third, a potential concern is that the new Shinkansen line was
introduced in high growth regions. As we only compare the differential growth for input relative to
21This approach is similar to Giroud (2013).
22The common demand side effect is captured in Stationf × I [t ≥ 2004].
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labor-intensive firms, endogeneity is not a concern as long as the Shinkansen line was not targeted
particularly for input-intensive firms.
5.1.1 Results
Table 3 shows regression results from estimating equation (4). Column (1) uses log sales relative to
the industry-year as the dependent variable. The triple interaction term β is positive and significant
at the 5 percent level, indicating that the Shinkansen expansion boosts firm sales for input-intensive
firms relative to labor-intensive firms. The magnitudes are economically significant: a coefficient of
0.47 means that a Shinkansen stop increased sales by 0.47 log points more for a firm with Hj = 1
relative to a firm with Hj = 0. A firm in the 9th decile of the Hj distribution (Hj = 0.92, e.g.,
industrial plastic products, JSIC 183) increased sales by roughly 0.10 log points more than a firm in
the 1st decile of the Hj distribution (Hj = 0.70, e.g., general goods rental and leasing, JSIC 701).
Columns (2) and (3) use labor productivity and TFPR as the dependent variable. Again, the triple
interaction term is positive and significant, suggesting that the infrastructure shock improved firm’s
productivity. The magnitudes are slightly smaller compared to sales, a firm in the 9th decile of the
Hj distribution improves labor productivity by 0.09 log points faster than a firm in the 1st decile.
The fact that an infrastructure project unrelated to transportation of goods can improve firm
performance by this magnitude is indeed remarkable. More broadly, our findings suggest that
domestic trade costs dampen economic activity by limiting buyer-supplier linkages and that reducing
these barriers will help development and growth. From a policy perspective, the results point to
important positive effects of large-scale infrastructure projects that are typically neglected from
cost-benefit analyses - that infrastructure projects can bring efficiency gains from freer flow of
information across firms.
5.1.2 Robustness
In this section, we explore a number of robustness checks. First, a potential concern is that input-
intensive firms near a new station tend to grow faster than labor-intensive firms near a new station
(but not in other locations), i.e. that there are pre-trends in the treatment relative to the control
group. A simple way to check for this is to conduct a falsification test. We estimate equation (4)
on the five year period 1998 to 2002 and incorrectly set the Shinkansen expansion to 2000, i.e. we
replace I [t ≥ 2004] with I [t ≥ 2000]. The results are shown in Table 4. For all three dependent
variables, the triple interaction term is not significantly different from zero, hence there are no
pre-trends in the data.
Another concern is that the results are sensitive to the chosen 30 km threshold for whether a firm
belongs to a new station or not. We therefore estimate the model with Stationf taking the value one
if firm f is within 10 km of a new station. The results in Table 5, columns (1) to (3) show that the
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results are relatively close to the baseline - the impact on sales is slightly stronger and the impact
on sales per employee and TFP is roughly similar. We also investigate whether firms in cities near
those served by the Shinkansen were affected. A common concern is that firms in adjacent cities
lose market share because they become less competitive relative to firms in cities with Shinkansen
service, the so-called “straw effect”. In Table 5, columns (4) to (6), we add an indicator variable for
whether a firm is between 30 to 60 km of a new station and the set of interactions with Hj and
I [t ≥ 2004]. The triple interaction term is slightly positive when sales is the dependent variable
and slightly negative when sales per employee and TFP is the dependent variable, indicating that
the impact on firms in adjacent cities is mixed.
Finally, a potential issue is that the results are primarily driven by the construction sector,
possibly because construction firms grow due to increased demand related to building the new
infrastructure. Note, however, that the triple differences approach should control for this, since
identification is based on comparing industries with different input intensities.23 Nevertheless, we
re-run the regression excluding firms belonging to construction industries (Table 6, columns (1) to
(3)). Overall the results are very similar to the baseline results in Table 3.
5.1.3 Commuting
The infrastructure shock also benefited firms due to more efficient commuting. First, the reduction
in travel time for existing commuters benefits both workers and firms by freeing up more time for
work and leisure. Second, firms in the treated areas can potentially attract and hire more workers or
find workers with skills that are better matched to the firm. Both effects will improve firm sales and
performance. If the positive impact coming from commuting is identical across industries, then our
results will be unaffected, since changes that affect all industries at the same time are differenced
out. Still, it could be that some industries benefit more from commuting than others.
One mechanism might be that labor intensive industries gain more than input- or capital in-
tensive industries simply because labor constitutes a larger share of the costs of production. This
would mean that the true effect coming from supplier linkages is larger than what we have estimated,
because input intensive industries benefit less from commuting than labor intensive industries. This
would tend to bias our results towards zero.
Another mechanism might be that skilled workers consider the cost of travel time to be higher
than unskilled workers, so that a large drop in travel time is more beneficial for skill-intensive
industries. We test this hypothesis by constructing a measure of skill intensity for each industry,
and then including triple interaction terms for skill intensity, in addition to the existing triple
interaction terms for input intensity. In the data, there is no direct measure of skill intensity. There
23Moreover, any potential bias would be negative because the construction demand shock occurred before 2004,
not after.
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is, however, a variable for the number of R&D workers. We define an industry’s R&D intensity
as the number of R&D workers relative to total workers in the industry. Across JSIC 3-digit
industries, almost 20 percent of the industries report zero R&D workers. Our preferred measure of
skill intensity is therefore an indicator variable equal to one if the industry has higher than median
R&D intensity (the median is 0.013). The results are shown in Table 6, columns (4) to (6); the
input intensity interaction term is close to the baseline results, while the skill intensity indicator is
close to zero. In sum, we conclude that, although commuting is certainly an important factor, it
does not significantly affect our estimates of the supply chain effect.
5.1.4 Congestion
Because the bullet train line only carries people, the main interpretation of our results is that the
infrastructure shock facilitated face-to-face meetings, leading to more suppliers and more efficient
buyer-seller relationships. A potential concern, however, is that the bullet train line freed up capacity
across other modes of transport, leading to less congestion for trucks and regular trains. If that were
the case, then the interpretation of our results would be different. We investigate this by exploring
data from the Net Freight Flow Census from Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism (MLIT). The census provides data on average freight time across Japan’s prefectures.
Table 7 shows the percent change in freight time from 2000 to 2010 across the prefectures on Japan’s
southern main island (Kyushu). The cells in bold are the prefecture pairs that were affected by the
bullet train. Although the data is noisy, there is no evidence that freight times fell, or increased by
less, in the affected prefectures relative to the unaffected prefectures. The average (median) increase
in freight time across all pairs were 18 (22) percent, while the increase in the affected pairs were 21
and 24 percent (for Kagoshima-Fukuoka and Kagoshima-Kumamoto respectively).
5.2 Economic Integration and Firm Linkages
The empirical results from Section 5.1 show that the infrastructure shock improves firm performance
and that the performance effects are stronger among input-intensive firms, consistent with the
model. In this section, we explore in more detail the economic mechanism behind this decline in
marginal costs. Our model suggests that the input price index of the firm, P (z), falls because
treated firms work more efficiently with existing suppliers, outsource more tasks and find better
suppliers for existing tasks (Sections 4.3 and 4.5). This section provides additional evidence that
the performance gains are driven by the supplier channel.
Recall that according to Proposition 2, lower trade and search costs lead to more supplier
connections of downstream firms in j. The aim of this section is therefore to test whether the
Shinkansen expansion affected the growth in supplier connections between the 2005 and 2010 cross-
sections of the TSR data.
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A problem with the TSR data is that a firm surveyed in 2005 may not be surveyed in 2010.
Hence, at the firm-level, the number of supplier connections could change simply due to variation
in sampling. In order to mitigate this issue, we aggregate the TSR data as follows. We divide
Japan into a grid consisting of 500 × 500 cells; each cell is a square roughly 5.6 kilometers on a
side. Next, we define Cijt as the number of suppliers in i serving customers in j at time t, where
t = {2005, 2010}. As many cells are covering water and other non-populated areas, the dataset
is reduced to roughly 8,000 cells, or localities, after removing these regions. We assign a dummy
variable Treati = 1 to a locality if one or more firms in i are within 30 kilometers of a new Shinkansen
stop. We also calculate great circle distances between the center of cells i and j, Distij . Note that
the sample selection issue described above is greatly reduced because Cijt is the sum of supplier
connections among all firms in j, so any sample selection noise in the in-degree of a given firm is
likely to be averaged out.24
In the data, a location j may get new connections for a variety of reasons which may be correlated
with the infrastructure shock. The empirical strategy is therefore to test whether location-pairs ij
where either i or j or both gets a new station increase their number of connections relative to
location-pairs where neither i nor j gets a new station. We therefore estimate the following model,
∆ lnCij = ξ
1
i + ξ
2
j + β1Bothij + β2Oneij + γXij + ij , (5)
where the dependent variable is the change in the log number of connections between suppliers in
i and buyers in j, ∆ lnCij = lnCij2010 − lnCij2005. The main independent variables are Bothij
which equals one if both i and j get a new station and Oneij which equals one if either i or j (but
not both) gets a new station.25 Location-pairs where neither i nor j gets a new station are the
omitted group. ξ1i and ξ
2
j are source and destination fixed effects respectively and Xij is a vector of
covariates (see below).
The inclusion of Bothij allows for the possibility that the impact on location-pairs with both
ends being newly connected to the Shinkansen train network may be stronger than if only one of
them is connected. The inclusion of Oneij allows for a new Shinkansen station close in i (but not
j) to impact connections from i to j and j to i.
The empirical framework has the flavor of a gravity model of the extensive margins of trade.
Consider the non-differenced version of equation (5), i.e. a specification with lnCij as the dependent
variable and with source-year, destination-year and location-pair fixed effects. That model would
identify the impact on the number of connections from the change in travel time for an affected
location-pair relative to unaffected location pairs. The source-year and destination-year fixed effects
would capture trends in economic activity which may differ across locations. The location-pair fixed
24The average number of firms in a cell is 104, see Table 8.
25Formally, Bothij = I [Treati = 1 ∩ Treatj = 1] andOneij = I [(Treati = 1 ∩ Treatj = 0) ∪ (Treati = 0 ∩ Treatj = 1)].
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effects would control for time-invariant determinants of bilateral trade between locations. Due to
the large number of fixed effects, we use the log change in Cij and obtain the estimating equation
(5).
The production network is observed at two moments in time, 2005 and 2010. The timing is not
ideal for our purposes, because the Shinkansen extension occurred in March 2004. The underlying
assumption is therefore that the impact of the expansion had not fully materialized when firms
were surveyed in 2005. Our hypothesis is that finding new suppliers is a slow and costly process, so
that it is unlikely that firms had fully adjusted after one year. Note that our estimates are biased
towards zero if firms partially adjusted before 2005.
5.2.1 Results
We start by documenting a few basic facts about the locality connections dataset. Table 8 show
descriptive statistics for the number of connections in 2005 and 2010. The average (median) number
of connections between a locality-pair was 7.05 (2) in 2005 and increased slightly to 7.51 (2) in 2010.
There are roughly 8,000 localities L and almost 400,000 locality-pairs with positive flows in both
2005 and 2010. This implies that many locality-pairs have zero connections, i.e. the number of
locality-pairs with positive transactions is much smaller than the theoretical maximum
(
L2 − L).26
Table 9 presents the results from estimating equation (5). Column (1) estimates the model
without any fixed effects, while columns (2) includes source and destination fixed effects. The
inclusion of these fixed effects controls for changes in the number of firms in the localities as well
as region-specific shocks (e.g., productivity shocks, population growth, internet and cell phone
coverage, and so on). Column (3) and (4) includes log distance and log distance interacted with
Bothij and Oneij as additional independent variables. Our preferred specifications are (3) and (4),
as there is evidence of agglomeration over time, i.e. that local connections grow faster than remote
connections (the distance coefficient being negative). It is important to control for this because
Bothij is negatively correlated with distance.
Overall, the results indicate that localities becoming connected by new stations (Bothij = 1)
increased their number of connections by roughly 40 percent relative to unconnected localities.
Recall that the average number of connections is 7, so for the average locality-pair, the Shinkansen
extension caused 3 new connections between newly connected localities. Our preferred specifications
in columns (3) and (4) suggest that the impact is roughly half as large when only one of the locations
in a pair is connected (Oneij = 1). Perhaps surprisingly, the interaction terms are close to zero.
We find no evidence that the infrastructure shock benefited remote connections more than local
26As the dependent variable is ∆ lnCij , we drop pairs with missing ∆ lnCij (Cij2005 = 0 or Cij2010 = 0). The 8000
localities i in the data therefore have either Cij > 0 or Cji > 0 for j 6= i. ii pairs are also dropped from the dataset
because distance is zero for these pairs and log distance is used as an independent variable in several regressions.
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connections.27
Robustness. In the baseline results, we used the threshold of 30 kilometers from a new station
to classify cells as treated or untreated. To check the sensitivity of the results, we instead use a
threshold of 10 kilometers. The results are presented in Table 10 and indicate that the results
are robust to this change. A potential concern in the baseline results is that location-pairs with
either Cij2005 = 0 or Cij2010 = 0 are dropped because of the log transformation. We address this
by replacing the dependent variable ∆ lnCij with a ∆I [Cijt > 0], i.e. a dummy variable taking
the value one if location-pair ij starts trading between 2005 and 2010, zero if there is no change,
and minus one if ij stops trading. Including all the zeros in the dataset results in an extremely
high number of observations (71 million), so estimation with joint source and destination fixed
effects becomes computationally infeasible. Table 11 therefore reports results with either source or
destination fixed effects in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The estimates confirm the findings in
the baseline specification; location-pairs with new stations are more likely to start trading (and less
likely to stop trading) between 2005 and 2010.
Summing up, we find significant growth in firm linkages between regions connected by the bullet
train. Moreover, this reallocation of the production network is consistent with the firm performance
gains found in Section 5.1.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines how firm performance is related to the characteristics of the supply network
with a special focus on geography. Using a comprehensive, unique data set on supplier-customer links
among 950,000 Japanese firms, we develop a set of facts about the production network. Geographic
proximity plays a key role for the matching of suppliers and customers as most connections cover
relatively short distances. Large, more productive firms both have more suppliers and, on average,
have suppliers that are farther away. While large firms have more suppliers, the trading partners of
those large, well-connected firms on average are less-well connected themselves.
Guided by these facts, we develop a simple model where firms can outsource tasks and search
for suppliers in different locations. Firms located in close proximity to other markets, and firms
that face low search costs, will search more and find better suppliers. This in turn drives down the
firm’s marginal production costs. We test the theory by exploiting the opening of a high-speed train
line in Japan which lowered the cost of passenger travel but left shipping costs unchanged.
We find compelling evidence that the supply network matters for firm performance. The in-
frastructure shock generated significant performance gains, especially for firms in industries that
27We also tested the hypothesis that the impact of distance is non-linear by including squared log distance. We
found that the distance elasticity is smaller for higher distances, however the interaction terms were insignificant and
close to zero.
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have large shares of purchased inputs. We also provide evidence that these gains are related to new
buyer-seller linkages as predicted by the model.
While there is a large literature on the link between infrastructure and improvements in regional
economic outcomes, this paper provides the first direct evidence on the role of infrastructure on
supply chains and firm performance. We highlight a novel transmission mechanism for the effects
of improved infrastructure where reductions in search costs and buyer-seller inefficiencies allow
firms to match with more and better suppliers, thus lowering the marginal cost of production.
The resulting geographic variation in marginal costs for otherwise ex-ante identical firms yields
systematic differences in economic activity across space. Firms in more geographically central
locations have lower marginal costs and produce more.
This work has emphasized the role of domestic suppliers in explaining firm performance. Our
results suggest that future research might fruitfully focus on how heterogeneous firms sort into
locations, how reduced travel time affects intensive and extensive margins in both domestic and
international buyer-supplier relationships, and how firm linkages form and evolve over time.
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Table 1: Firm performance and distance to supplier.
In-degree Sales Employment Labor prod.
All firms:
Distance 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(338.40) (268.30) (273.25) (99.14)
R-sq 0.58 0.62 0.59 0.46
N 3,345,585 3,336,944 3,336,784 3,332,215
Single-plant firms:
Distance 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(14.07) (7.82) (7.07) (4.59)
R-sq 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.63
N 275,233 274,688 274,786 274,273
Buyer prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supplier FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each column represents a dependent variable. t-statistics in parentheses. All variables in
logs. Labor productivity is calculated as sales relative to the number of employees. ’All firms’ refers
to all firm pairs in the data. ’Single-plant firms’ refers to firm-pairs where both buyer and seller
are single-plant. ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗ significant at the 0.05 level, ∗ significant at the
0.1 level.
Table 2: Firm sales, in-degree, out-degree and distance to connections.
Dep. variable: # sourcing # customer Median distance Median distance In-degree Out-degree
cities cities to suppliers to customers
Firm sales 0.31∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(49.92) (23.37) (2.17) (14.36) (34.14) (22.06)
..×Single plant 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗∗∗
(1.30) (5.07) (5.06) (6.30) (0.09) (5.33)
..×Single industry -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(19.64) (8.26) (6.04) (0.52) (26.24) (12.13)
# industries 401 401 401 401 403 403
# obs 429,160 429,160 428,891 428,891 441,156 441,156
R-sq 0.36 0.28 0.01 0.03 0.36 0.25
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All variables are in logs. Only firms with positive in- and out-degree are included
in sample. JSIC 3 digit industry fixed effects included in all regressions. Single plant= 1 if the firm is a single-plant firm and
zero otherwise. Single industry =1 if the firm only belongs to one 3-digit JSIC industry and zero otherwise (the data includes
up to three 3-digit industries per firm). ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗ significant at the 0.05 level, ∗ significant at the 0.1
level.
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Table 3: Firm Performance.
(1) Sales (2) Sales/employee (3) TFPR
Stationf ×Hj × Post2004t 0.47∗∗ 0.42∗ 0.29∗∗
(2.12) (1.76) (2.44)
Firm and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
# obs 148,264 146,466 145,058
# firms 18,068 18,068 18,018
R-sq 0.97 0.92 0.94
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variables are in logs and are measured
relative to industry-year means. ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗ significant at the 0.05
level, ∗ significant at the 0.1 level.
Table 4: Firm Performance: Falsification test.
(1) Sales (2) Sales/employee (3) TFPR
Stationf ×Hj × Post2000t -0.30 -0.05 -0.02
(1.05) (0.22) (0.17)
Firm and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
# obs 66,756 66,756 66,487
# firms 14,165 14,165 14,158
R-sq 0.99 0.94 0.95
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variables are in logs and are measured
relative to industry-year means. ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗ significant at the 0.05
level, ∗ significant at the 0.1 level.
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Table 5: Firm Performance: Robustness I.
(1) Sales (2) Sales/ (3) TFPR (4) Sales (5) Sales (6) TFPR
empl empl
Station0−10f ×Hj × Post2004t 0.60∗∗ 0.39∗ 0.29∗∗
(2.28) (1.80) (2.57)
Station0−30f ×Hj × Post2004t 0.47∗∗ 0.42∗ 0.29∗∗
(2.12) (1.76) (2.43)
Station30−60f ×Hj × Post2004t 0.08∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(2.09) (2.61) (2.76)
Skill intensity controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs 148,264 146,466 145,058 148,264 146,466 145,058
# firms 18,068 18,068 18,018 18,068 18,068 18,018
R-sq 0.97 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.92 0.94
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variables are in logs and are measured relative to industry-year
means. ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗ significant at the 0.05 level, ∗ significant at the 0.1 level. Stationx−yf = 1
if firm f is between x and y km from a new station. Columns (1)-(3): As baseline but use 10 km threshold instead
of 30 km threshold. Columns (4)-(6): As baseline but add interactions with Station30−60f .
Table 6: Firm Performance: Robustness II.
(1) Sales (2) Sales (3) TFPR (1) Sales (2) Sales (3) TFPR
/empl /empl
Stationf ×Hj × Post2004t 0.52∗∗ 0.43∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.41∗ 0.28∗∗
(2.34) (1.81) (2.61) (2.01) (1.73) (2.38)
Stationf ×R&Dj × Post2004t -0.05∗ -0.02 -0.01
(1.79) (0.53) (0.30)
Construction industry No No No Yes Yes Yes
Skill intensity controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs 145,641 143,868 142,474 145,641 143,868 142,474
# firms 17,729 17,729 17,681 17,729 17,729 17,681
R-sq 0.97 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.92 0.94
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variables are in logs and are measured relative to industry-year
means. ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗ significant at the 0.05 level, ∗ significant at the 0.1 level. Columns (1) to
(3): Construction excluded. Columns (4) to (6): 2003 R&D indicator variable of industry as well as interactions with
Stationf and Post2004t included.
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Table 7: Freight time, % change 2000 to 2010.
Saga Nagasaki Kumamoto Oita Miyazaki Kagoshima
Fukuoka 4 28 27 58 -25 21
Saga -8 30 4 -52 5
Nagasaki 72 54 9 20
Kumamoto 88 -38 24
Oita 22 32
Miyazaki -6
Note: Table shows the % change in freight time from 2000 to 2010 from the Net Freight Flow
Census (NFFC) collected by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT).
Numbers refer to average freight time across different modes (train, truck, air and sea).
Table 8: Connections: Descriptive statistics.
Mean Median Std.dev. min max
Cij2005 7.05 2 62.35 1 16507
Cij2010 7.51 2 59.93 1 14808
∆ lnCij 0.08 0 0.56 -3.47 3.78
Bothij 0.01 0 0.08 0 1
Oneij 0.02 0 0.14 0 1
Firms per cell 104.21 19 463.30 1 21,207
# sources 7,613
# destinations 8,054
# obs 386,294
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Table 9: Shinkansen: Growth in connections.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bothij 0.07∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(5.91) (7.91) (20.12) (7.93)
Oneij -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 0.19∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(3.56) (0.74) (19.87) (6.42)
lnDistij -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(71.32) (81.98)
Bothij × lnDistij -0.01
(0.86)
Oneij × lnDistij 0.01∗
(1.87)
Destination FE No Yes Yes Yes
Source FE No Yes Yes Yes
# obs 386,294 386,294 386,294 386,294
# sources 7,613 7,613 7,613
# destinations 8,054 8,054 8,054
R-sq 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.18
Note: Bootstrapped t-statistics in parentheses with 200 replications. Dependent
variable is ∆ lnCij = lnCij2010 − lnCij2005. ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗
significant at the 0.05 level, ∗ significant at the 0.1 level.
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Table 10: Shinkansen: Growth in connections. 10 km threshold.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bothij 0.09∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(3.46) (6.48) (23.87) (5.97)
Oneij -0.05∗∗∗ -0.01 0.20∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(6.02) (1.07) (23.58) (4.76)
lnDistij -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(76.66) (104.35)
Bothij × lnDistij 0.00
(0.16)
Oneij × lnDistij 0.01∗
(1.72)
Destination FE No Yes Yes Yes
Source FE No Yes Yes Yes
# obs 386,294 386,294 386,294 386,294
# sources 7,613 7,613 7,613
# destinations 8,054 8,054 8,054
R-sq 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.18
Note: Bootstrapped t-statistics in parentheses with 200 replications. Dependent
variable is ∆ lnCij = lnCij2010 − lnCij2005. ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗
significant at the 0.05 level, ∗ significant at the 0.1 level.
Table 11: Shinkansen: Extensive margin connections.
Bothij 0.71∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
(17.30) (17.28) (16.50)
Oneij 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(9.71) (7.87) (6.03)
lnDistij -0.26∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(240.64) (232.24) (232.79)
Destination FE No No Yes
Source FE No Yes No
# obs 70,676,571 70,130,526 70,130,526
# sources 8,612
# destinations 8,612
R-sq 0.00 0.00
Notes: Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. t-statistics in parentheses.
Dependent variable is ∆I [Cijt > 0]. ∗∗∗ significant at the 0.01 level, ∗∗ significant
at the 0.05 level, ∗ significant at the 0.1 level.
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Appendix
A Optimal Search
The solution for τ¯ is
τ¯ (z, j) = κ1
(
T
wσ
A
f (j)
)1/θ
Φ (z, j)−k/θ z(σ−1)/θ.
Proof. The maximization problem of the firm is
max
τ¯
{pi (z, j)− wf (j)n (z, j)} ,
where pi (z, j) = Ap (z, j)1−σ /σ. A is the demand shifter for final goods, A = w (1 + ψ) L¯Qσ−1,
where Q is the CES price index for final goods. Given monopolistic competition and CES prefer-
ences, the firm charges a price that is a constant mark-up over marginal costs: p (z, j) = m¯wαP (z, j)1−α /z,
where m¯ = σ/ (σ − 1). Inserting p and P into the profit function then yields
pi (z, j) =
(
m¯λ1−α
)1−σ
σ
Aw1−σΦ (z, j)(σ−1)(1−α)/θ zσ−1.
The expressions for Φ and n are
Φ (z, j) = T0 +
ˆ τ¯(z,j)
1
Tτ−θg (τ, j) dτ,
n (z, j) =
ˆ τ¯(z,j)
1
g (τ, j) dτ.
Differentiating with respect to τ¯ yields
∂Φ (z, j)
∂τ¯
= T τ¯−θg (τ¯ , j) ,
∂n (z, j)
∂τ¯
= g (τ¯ , j) .
The first order condition is then(
m¯λ1−α
)1−σ
σ
A
(σ − 1) (1− α)
θ
w1−σΦ (z, j)(σ−1)(1−α)/θ−1 zσ−1T τ¯−θ = wf (j) .
Rearranging,
τ¯ (z, j) = κ1
(
T
wσ
A
f (j)
)1/θ
Φ (z, j)−k/θ z(σ−1)/θ,
where κ1 =
(
(m¯λ1−α)
1−σ
σ
(σ−1)(1−α)
θ
)1/θ
and k = 1− (σ − 1) (1− α) /θ.
The second order condition is(
m¯λ1−α
)1−σ
σ
A
(σ − 1) (1− α)
θ
zσ−1w1−σ
(
−kΦ−k−1
(
∂Φ (z, j)
∂τ¯
)2
+
∂2Φ (z, j)
∂τ¯2
Φ (z, j)−k
)
−wf (j) ∂
2n (z, j)
∂τ¯2
< 0.
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Inserting the expressions for ∂2Φ/∂τ¯2 and ∂n/∂n2, this can be rewritten as
(
m¯λ1−α
)1−σ
σ
A
(σ − 1) (1− α)
θ
zσ−1w1−σΦ1−k
T τ¯−θ
Φ
(
− k
Φ
T τ¯−θg2 − θτ¯−1g + g′
)
− wf (j) g′ < 0.
Using the first order condition, we know that the following must hold in optimum:
pi (z, j)χ (z, j) = wf
θ
(σ − 1) (1− α) ,
where χ is the trade share from the marginal location τ¯ , χ (z, j) = T τ¯ (z, j)−θ /Φ (z, j). This tells
us that gross profits from the marginal location τ¯ equals the fixed search cost f multiplied by the
factor θ/ (σ − 1) (1− α). Exploiting this relationship gives us the second order condition
kχ (z, j) g (τ¯ , j) +
θ
τ¯
> 0.
B Predictions of the Model
This section derives implications of the model described in Sections 4.3 and 4.5 of the main text.
B.1 The relationship between τ¯ and z
The cutoff τ¯ is increasing in z, ∂τ¯/∂z > 0.
Proof. Using equation (1), we have
∂Φ
∂z
=
∂τ¯
∂z
T τ¯−θg (τ¯ , j) .
Using equation (2), we have
∂τ¯
∂z
= κ1
(
T
wσ
A
f (j)
)1/θ
Φ (z, j)−k/θ z(σ−1)/θ
(
−k
θ
Φ (z, j)−1
∂Φ
∂z
+
σ − 1
θ
z−1
)
.
Substituting in ∂Φ/∂z and rearranging yields
∂τ¯
∂z
=
(σ − 1) /z
θ/τ¯ + kχ¯ (z, j) g (τ¯ , j)
,
which is positive given that the regularity condition θ/τ¯ + kχ¯ (z, j) g (τ¯ , j) > 0 holds.
This also implies that ∂o/∂z > 0 because ∂Φ/∂z > 0.
41
B.2 The relationship between τ¯ and f (j)
The cutoff τ¯ is decreasing in costs f (j), ∂τ¯/∂f (j) < 0.
Proof. Using equation (1), we have
∂Φ (z, j)
∂f (j)
=
∂τ¯
∂f
T τ¯−θg (τ¯ , j) .
Using equation (2), we have
∂τ¯ (z, j)
∂f (j)
= −1
θ
τ¯ (z, j)
1
f
(
1 + k
∂Φ
∂f
f
Φ (z, j)
)
.
Substituting in ∂Φ/∂f and rearranging yields
∂τ¯ (z, j)
∂f (j)
=
−1/f
θ/τ¯ + kχ¯ (z, j) g (τ¯ , j)
,
which is negative given that the regularity condition θ/τ¯ + kχ¯ (z, j) g (τ¯ , j) > 0 holds. This means
that
∂n (z, j)
∂f (j)
=
∂τ¯ (z, j)
∂f (j)
g (τ¯ , j) < 0.
Note that we can also express
∂Φ (z, j)
∂f (j)
f (j)
Φ (z, j)
= − χ (z, j) g (τ¯ , j)
θ/τ¯ + kχ (z, j) g (τ¯ , j)
< 0.
Furthermore, ∂o/∂f < 0 because ∂Φ/∂f < 0.
B.3 Assortivity
The expected measure of buyers from j among suppliers in z’s marginal market is decreasing in
efficiency z.
Proof. The expected measure of buyers from j for a task ω in a location with trade costs τ (given
the assumption of a unit continuum of tasks) is
c (τ, j) = m (j)
ˆ
z(τ,j)
Tτ−θ
Φ (z, j)
λ (z, j) dz
= m (j)Tτ−θ
ˆ
z(τ,j)
λ (z, j)
Φ (z, j)
dz,
where λ (z, j) is the density of productivity in location j and z (τ, j) is the minimum efficiency z
required in order to source from a location with trade costs τ . The expected measure of buyers
from j among suppliers in z0’s marginal market is therefore
c¯ (z0, j) = m (j)T τ¯ (z0)
−θ
ˆ
z0
λ (z, j)
Φ (z, j)
dz.
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We get
c¯ (z0, j)
∂z0
= −m (j)T τ¯ (z0)−θ
[
θ
τ¯ (z0)
∂τ¯
∂z0
ˆ
z0
λ (z, j)
Φ (z, j)
dz +
λ (z0, j)
Φ (z0, j)
]
,
which is negative because ∂τ¯/∂z0 > 0 (see Section B.1).
Hence, the average supplier in a downstream firm’s marginal market is less well-connected if
downstream productivity z0 is higher.
B.4 The relationship between trade costs and expected productivity of a buyer
The expected productivity of a downstream buyer from j is increasing in trade costs between supplier
and buyer.
Proof. The expected productivity of buyers from j for a task ω is
E [z (j, τ)] =
ˆ
z(τ,j)
v (z) zλ (z, j) dz,
with weights
v (z) =
Tτ−θ
Φ(z,j)´
z(τ,j)
Tτ−θ
Φ(z,j)λ (z, j) dz
=
Φ (z, j)−1´
z(τ,j) Φ (z, j)
−1 λ (z, j) dz
.
Differentiating with respect to τ yields
E [z (j, τ)]
∂τ
=
∂z
∂τ
λ (z, j)
Φ (z, j)
´
z(τ,j) z
λ(z,j)
Φ(z,j)dz −
´
z(τ,j) z
λ(z,j)
Φ(z,j)dz(´
z(τ,j)
λ(z,j)
Φ(z,j)dz
)2 .
The sum of the two integrals in the numerator is positive because we integrate over z > z. Moreover,
∂z/∂τ = 1/ [∂τ¯/∂z] > 0, so that the E [z (j, τ)] /∂τ > 0.
Hence, when comparing a supplier’s connections in different markets, the expected productivity
of a buyer is higher in markets with higher trade costs.
C Distributional Assumptions
Assume that τ is inversely Pareto distributed with support [1, τH ] and shape γ > θ: The density is
g (τ) = γ
τ−γH
1−τ−γH
τγ−10 and the cdf is G (τ) =
[
τ−γH /
(
1− τ−γH
)]
(τγ0 − 1) . An inverse Pareto captures
the empirical fact that a location j has few nearby markets and many remote markets; we show in
Appendix F that the inverse Pareto is a reasonable approximation of the empirical distribution of
distance in our data. Note that a distribution with high upper bound τH first-order stochastically
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dominates a distribution with a low upper bound. Denote the two distributions (i) and (ii); then
for τ (i)H > τ
(ii)
H , we have G
(i) (τ) < G(ii) (τ). This can be seen by differentiating the cdf:
∂G
∂τH
= − γτ
−γ−1
H(
1− τ−γH
)2 (τγ − 1) < 0.
In addition, we assume that a downstream firm’s average productivity in task production, T0,
is related to the average cost of purchasing tasks in the marketplace as follows: T0 =
Tτ−γH
1−τ−γH
γ
γ−θ .
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Hence, a downstream firm cannot be too efficient in producing tasks itself, otherwise there would
be no incentive to outsource. Given these additional assumptions, the hurdle τ¯ , equilibrium market
access Φ and measure of searched locations n are
τ¯ (z, j) = κ2
(
A
wσf (j)
)1/ω
T (1−k)/ωz(σ−1)/ω, (6)
Φ (z, j) =
Tτ−γH
1− τ−γH
γ
γ − θ τ¯ (z, j)
γ−θ , (7)
n (z, j) =
τ−γH
1− τ−γH
(τ¯ (z, j)γ − 1) , (8)
where ω = θ+ k (γ − θ) and κ2 is a constant.29 The sourcing problem has an interior solution only
if the second order condition, ω > 0, is satisfied. Henceforth, we focus exclusively on the interior
solution, i.e. ω > 0.
D Propositions
Proposition 1 states that (i) Lower search costs f (j) and trade costs τH lead to growth in sales
among downstream firms in j. (ii) Sales growth is stronger in input-intensive (low α) relative to
labor intensive (high α) industries.
Proof. Under the distributional assumption for g (τ, j), we get
∂ ln r (z, j)
∂ ln f (j)
= −(σ − 1) (1− α)
θ
γ − θ
ω
< 0,
∂ ln r (z, j)
∂ ln τH
= −(σ − 1) (1− α)
θ
γ
1− τ−γH
< 0,
and
∂2 ln r (z, j)
∂ ln f (j) ∂ (1− α) = −
σ − 1
θ
γ − θ
ω
(
1 + (1− α) σ − 1
θ
γ − θ
ω
)
< 0,
∂2 ln r (z, j)
∂ ln τH∂ (1− α) = −
σ − 1
θ
γ
1− τ−γH
< 0,
28Note that
´ τH
1
Tτ−θg (τ, j) dτ =
Tτ
−γ
H
1−τ−γ
H
γ
γ−θ
(
τγ−θH − 1
)
, so T0 equals
´ τH
1
Tτ−θg (τ, j) dτ/
(
τγ−θH − 1
)
.
29κ2 = κ
θ/ω
1
(
τ
−γ
H
1−τ−γ
H
γ
γ−θ
)−k/ω
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hence the elasticity of sales with respect to both fixed costs f (j) and variable costs τH is negative,
and the elasticity is more negative when 1− α is high.
Proposition 2 states that lower search costs f (j) and variable costs τH lead to more outsourcing
o (z, j) and suppliers from more locations n (z, j) among downstream firms in j.
Proof. Section B.2 derives ∂n (z, j) /∂f (j) < 0 and ∂o (z, j) /∂f (j) < 0. Under the distributional
assumption for g (τ, j), we get
∂Φ (z, j)
∂τH
= −Φ (z, j) γ τ
−1
H
1− τ−γH
< 0,
and therefore
∂o (z, j)
∂τH
= T0Φ (z, j)
−2 ∂Φ
∂τH
< 0.
Furthermore,
∂n (z, j)
∂τH
= −n (z, j) γ τ
−1
H(
1− τ−γH
) < 0.
Hence, both the share of tasks outsouced and the measure of locations searched increase as search
costs f (j) or variable costs τH fall.
E Sales per employee and TFPR
This section discusses the use of sales per employee (LP ) and revenue productivity (TFPR) in the
context of the model.
We start with sales per employee. By using the expression for the production function, sales per
employee can be written as
LP =
py
l
= pz
(v
l
)1−α
.
Inserting the first order condition, v/l = [(1− α) /α]w/P , we get
LP =
(
1− α
α
)1−α
pz
(w
P
)1−α
.
Inserting the expression for prices, p = m¯kwαP 1−α/z, where k = α−α (1− α)−(1−α), we get
LP =
m¯w
α
.
Hence, sales per employee is constant across firms within the same industry. Note that if output
prices p are sticky, then a fall in sourcing costs P lead to a rise in LP .
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Revenue productivity is defined as
TFPR =
py
(vP )1−α lα
=
pz
P 1−α
,
where we in the second equality inserted the production function.30 Inserting prices yields
TFPR = m¯kwα,
which is also constant across firms within the same industry. Note that if output prices p are sticky,
then a fall in sourcing costs P lead to a rise in TFPR. Intuitively, this occurs because TFPR
controls for the value of inputs vP , instead of the quantity of inputs v, so that a fall in P translates
into a rise in TFPR.
F The distribution of trade costs
This section provides empirical support for the assumption that trade costs are inversely Pareto
distributed with density
g (τ) = γ
τ−γH
1− τ−γH
τγ−10 . (9)
Let distance d from location i be inversely Pareto distributed with support [0, dHi] and shape
parameter κ > 0. The cdf is
Hi (d) =
(
d
dHi
)κ
.
Consider the 500x500 grid dataset described in Section 5.2. We calculate distance for every location
pair ij and the empirical distribution of distance for each location i. Due to the large number of
location-pairs, we limit the calculations to the 1st, 2nd, .., 9th deciles of the distance distribution.
From this, we obtain the k-th decile in location i, dik. If the distribution is inverse Pareto, the
following must hold:
lnHik = −κ ln diH + κ ln dik, (10)
where Hik takes the values 0.1 for k = 1, 0.2 for k = 2 and so on. The inverse Pareto should fit the
data well if the relationship between Hik and the dik is approximately log linear. Figure 9 plots Hik
against dik − d¯i, where d¯i = (1/9)
∑9
k=1 dik, on log axes. The normalization removes the constant
term diH which may vary across locations. Overall, the relationship is close to linear, although there
is clearly heterogeneity in the distribution across locations. Estimating equation (10) with location
fixed effects produces a slope coefficient κ of 1.07.
30We have omitted capital in the definition of TFPR because capital is not in the model. The analysis in this
section would be similar if we included capital. When estimating TFPR, capital is controlled for, see Section G.1.
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Figure 9: The cdf of distance across locations.
Note: Axes on log scales.
As is common in the literature, we assume that for large d, τ (d) is well approximated by the
power law τ = (αd)ρ with α > 0 and ρ > 0. Then τ inherits the distribution of d with shape
parameter γ = κ/ρ. Because τ ≥ 1, the τ density has support [1, τH ], which yields the expression
of g (τ) given in equation 9.
G Data Appendix
G.1 Firm Performance
This section describes the measures of firm performance used in Section 5.1. As in Klette (1999),
all firm level variables are demeaned relative to industry-year means, ln yˆijt = ln yijt − ¯ln yjt, where
ln yˆijt refers to the demeaned variable for firm i in industry j at time t, ln yijt refers to the original
log variable and ¯ln yjt refers to the mean of the log variable in industry-year jt. The industry
classification is 3-digit JSIC. Demeaning by industry-year has the benefit that it eliminates the
need for deflating nominal variables; moreover it allows the technology of an industry to move freely
over time.
TFPR is estimated by the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure. We estimate the gross production
function
lnRevenueit = βl lnLaborit + βm lnMaterialsit + βk lnCapitalit + ωit + ηit, (11)
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where ωit is total factor productivity of the firm and ηit is either measurement error or a shock
to productivity which is not forecastable during the period in which labor can be adjusted. After
obtaining the estimates βˆl, βˆm and βˆk, TFPR is calculated by subtracting predicted output from
actual output,
TFPRit = ωˆit = lnRevenueit − β̂l lnLaborit − β̂m lnMaterialsit − β̂k lnCapitalit.
G.2 Input intensity
Input intensity Hj is calculated as input costs relative to total costs for each JSIC 3-digit industry
j in year 2003. Specifically, denote WCj total wage costs for industry j, WCj =
∑
i∈j wage costsi
and total costs TCj =
∑
i∈j total costsi. Hj is then Hj = 1 −WCj/TCj . Figure 10 shows the
density of Hj across all 315 JSIC industries.
Figure 10: Density of input intensity Hj across industries.
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Figure 11: Size and median distance to connections: Single-plant firms
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Note: 2005 data. The figure shows the kernel-weighted local polynomial regres-
sion of firm-level median log distance to the firm’s connections (vertical axis) on
log sales (horizontal axis). Firms with more than one plant are excluded. The
two lines represent distance to suppliers and customers as separate regressions.
Gray area denotes the 95 percent confidence bands. Sample is first trimmed by
excluding the 0.1 percent lowest and highest observations of sales.
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